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Abstract- Dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA)
seeks to exploit the variations in the loads of vari-
ous radio-access networks to allocate the spectrum
efficiently. Here, a spectrum manager implements
DSA by periodically auctioning short-term spectrum
licenses. We solve analytically the problem of the
operator of a CDMA cell populated by delay-
tolerant terminals operating at various data rates, on
the downlink, and representing users with dissimilar
"willingness to pay" (WtP). WtP is the most a user
would pay for a correctly transferred information
bit. The operator finds a revenue-maximising inter-
nal pricing and a service priority policy, along with
a bid for spectrum. Our clear and specific analytical
results apply to a wide variety of physical layer
configurations. The optimal operating point can be
easily obtained from the frame-success rate function.
At the optimum, (with a convenient time scale) a
terminal's contribution to revenues is the product of
its WtP by its data rate; and the product of its WtP
by its channel gain determines its service priority
("revenue per Hertz"). Assuming a second-price
auction, the operator's optimal bid for a certain
spectrum band equals the sum of the individual
revenue contributions of the additional terminals
that could be served, if the band is won.
I. INTRODUCTION
Static (fixed) spectrum allocation permanently
assigns a segment of the radio frequency spectrum
to a radio access networks (RAN). Static spectrum
allocation can be very inefficient, in the presence
of bandwidth demands that vary highly along the
space dimension (from region to region) and/or
along the time dimension (from hour to hour).
Dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA) seeks to ex-
ploit the variations in the loads of various RAN's
to allocate the spectrum efficiently. Reference [1]
discusses two DSA schemes that have been re-
cently studied. Important differences between [1]
and the present work include: (i) our emphasis
on a pricing-driven solution, as well as our con-
sideration of (ii) data-transmitting terminals over
CDMA, (iii) physical layer issues, (iv) the value
of the service to a user ("willingness to pay").
In the present work, a "spectrum manager" im-
plements DSA by auctioning short-term spectrum
licenses. Just before the start of a DSA period, a
network operator bids for spectrum, on the basis
of the current state of its network. But all the
awarded spectrum licenses simultaneously expire
at the end of a specified short period, after which
the allocation process is repeated. It is clear that a
government agency could become the "spectrum
manager". But there is another less obvious possi-
bility: Spectrum owners in a given locality could
create a "spectrum managing firm". They could
transfer their spectrum rights to the managing
firm, while maintaining ownership of this firm.
And they may instruct the managing firm to use
economic tools to allocate short-term spectrum
rights to the original spectrum owners themselves,
(and, possibly, to new communication firms that
they may approve). Of course, the managing firm's
profits will eventually be distributed among its
owners (the original spectrum owners).
Implementing DSA via short-term spectrum li-
censes raises some important issues. First, what
should be the "guiding principle" of the spectrum
manager : revenue-maximisation, fairness, overall
efficiency, etc.? Second, which market "mecha-
nism" should be used : linear pricing, nonlinear
pricing, auctions, etc.? Auctions seem a natural
choice, but many formats are available, and the
best choice is not obvious. Herein we assume that
an auction format has been already agreed upon,
such that it is optimal for each selfish participant
to submit a bid that equals its true valuation
of the "object". One such format is the multi-
unit version of the auction proposed by [2]. In
the original "second price" or Vickrey auction,
"sealed bids" are submitted for an object. The
highest bidder wins, but pays an amount that
equals the highest losing bid. In practise, special
provisions must be made to avoid certain types of
malicious behaviour in this or any auction format.
We do not discuss such measures, but refer the
interested reader to a relevant discussion in [3].
We focus on the problem of the operator of a
CDMA cell, populated by delay-tolerant terminals
operating at various data rates, on the down-
link. Given the current status of the network, the
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operator must determine the maximum revenue
corresponding to a given amount of spectrum,
because this information determines his optimal
bid. But the operator's revenues depend on its
own internal pricing policies. Thus, optimal end-
user prices must be found together with a bidding
strategy. In [41, a parallel strand of work, we
provide optimal pricing results, for a similar but
simpler situation in which the spectrum manager
directly sells short-term licenses at a unit price (no
auctions are used).
There are several works that apply Vickrey-
like schemes in a communication context. For
instance, [5] makes a similar proposal for band-
width allocation in a wired network (which [6]
later applies to CDMA power control). But [5]
assumes that each bidder can choose "bands"
of an arbitrary widths, which complicates imple-
mentation and analysis. Also of interest are [7],
which explores pricing issues in the downlink of
a CDMA cell, and [8], which studies capacity and
pricing optimisation for a communication resource
subject to congestion.
II. MULTI-UNIT VICKREY AUCTION
The multi-unit second-price (Vickrey) auction
when applied to spectrum allocation works as
follows. The available spectrum is divided into K
bands, each of width w. We assume that an oper-
ator cares about how many but not which bands
he is assigned (all bands are equally good for
the considered radio access technologies). Each
operator submits a bid vector with K components.
The first component means how much the bidder
offers to pay for the first band assigned to him
(whichever it is). The kth component means how
much he offers to pay for an additioncal band if
k - 1 bands have already been assigned to him.
The spectrum manager receives all the bid vectors
and assigns the bands as follows: first, the top
overall bid (by looking at the components of all
bid vectors) gets one band, the second highest bid
wins the next band, and so on, until the K bands
have been assigned. Notice that the overall highest
and the second highest bids could be components
of the same vector. Thus, the first several bands
(possibly all) could go to the same bidder. A
critical detail is that what a winner pays for a band
depends on the losing bids of the opponents. For
the first won band, a bidder will pay the highest
losing bid submitted by the other bidders; for the
next won band, he will pay the second-highest
losing bid (excluding his own), and so on. Thus,
a bidder that has won k bands, will pay the sum
of the k highest losing bids submitted by the other
bidders. (Ties are broken at random).
For example, let K = 3. A bid (bl, b1, b3)
means: I offer to pay bi if I end tip with a total of
one band allocated to me (I don't care which one),
I offer bI + b2 for a total of two bands, and I offer
b1 + b2 + b3 for all 3 bands. Suppose that only
two bid vectors are submitted: bl= (5, 3,2) and
b2=(4.5,4,l). The assignment goes as follows: one
of the bands goes to bidder 1 (5 is top overall bid),
the next band goes to bidder 2 (second highest bid
is 4.5), the last band also goes to bidder 2 (the
third highest bid is 4, the second component of
b2). Since bidder 1 won only one band, he will
pay the highest losing bid submitted by bidder
2, which was 1. Bidder 2 won two bands, and
will pay the sum of the two highest losing bids
submitted by bidder 1, that is, 3+2=5. Thus, the
auctioneer will get a total of 6.
III. THE MOTIVES OF OPERATORS AND
END-USERS
A. Optimisation problem of a network operator
The main question the operator must answer is
how much to bid for spectrum at a given DSA pe-
riod. At the moment of bidding, the operator will
know the number and characteristics of the termi-
nals operating in its network, including the details
of the physical communication layer (modulation,
error-control coding, mode of diversity, etc). A
distinguishing feature of the chosen auction for-
mat is that the bidder "best response" is to bid
his "true valuation" of the object being auctioned.
In our specific case, "truthful bidding" means
that the first component of a bid vector should
equal the maximum revenues that the operator
could obtain if he gets a single band of spectrum
(and nothing else). The second component should
equal the extra revenue he would get if instead
of only one band, he gets a total of two, etc.
But the operator's revenues also depend on his
own pricing policies. Thus, the operator must
determine his own (internal) pricing policy along
with the bid.
In determining an operator's end-user pric-
ing, we neglect the competition among opera-
tors. The monopoly analysis provides some useful
"bounds": it is the "best case scenario" for the op-
erator, and the "worst case scenario" for the end-
user. Additionally, this analysis may be a useful
approximation of the situation often observed in
practise, in which relatively few operators domi-
nate a given region.
B. Behaviour of the terminals
We must specify the behaviour of a data ter-
minal that can choose resources, in the presence
of pricing. We focus strictly on the downlink of
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a single CDMA cell. Reference [9] provides the
basic physical model.
We assume a QoS index of the form
-Bi+±i
where (i) P3i is the monetary value to the terminal
of one information bit successfully transferred
(a constant for a given terminal), (ii) Bi is the
(average) number of information bits the terminal
has successfully transferred within a fixed length
of time, say t, and (iii) yi is the amount of money
the terminal has left after any charges and rewards
are computed. This model is grounded on the
micro-economic concepts of quasi-linear utility
function, and partial-equilibrium analysis [10, Ch.
10].
Bi will generally depend on some physical
index of quality of service (QoS), xi (to be spec-
ified further below). When the terminal must pay
ci(x) for QoS level xi, it chooses xi to maximise
I3iBi(xi) + [Di -c(xi)]. I3Bi(xi) is the "value" to
the terminal of the bits it gets to transfer over
the reference period (the terminal's "benefit"), and
Di is the terminal's monetary budget. Di is just a
constant for a given terminal, which limits its total
expenditure. If Di is relatively "large", it needs not
be considered. Thus, the terminal chooses QoS to
maximise benefits minus cost: riBi (xi) -ci (xi).
IV. PHYSICAL MODEL
Before proceeding with the analysis, we specify
in greater detail the physical model.
1) N is the number of terminals receiving data
simultaneously from a CDMA base station
(BS) (downlink operation). The BS has a
total downlink power constraint of P.
2) Ri bps is the data rate of terminal i
3) RC cps is the chip rate of the channel, com-
mon to all terminals. For convenience, we
set RC = W, where W is the total bandwidth
(spectrum) allocated to the cell.
4) G1 = W/R1 is the spreading (processing)
gain of terminal i.
5) Information is sent in M-bit packets carrying
L < M information bits.
6) fs(xi) is the frame-success function (FSF)
giving the probability of correct reception
of a data packet as a function of the signal-
to-interference ratio (SIR) at the receiver.
Below, f(x) : =fs(x) - fs(O) replaces fs(x)
to avoid certain technical problems [9]. As
an example, for non-coherent FSK mod-
ulation, with packet size M=80, indepen-
dent bit errors, no forward error correction,
and perfect error detection, FSF is fs(x) -
[1 1- exp (X ')]. However, we stress that
our analysis does not rely on this or any
specific FSF. We assume that all we know
C
... ..-.
Fig. 1. From [4]. pricing for revenue maximisation.
about the physical layer is that the FSF
has the "S" shape shown in figure 1. The
technical characterisation of an "S-curve"
and some useful results are given in [11].
7) Following [7] we assume that in the down-
link, the CDMA signatures retain their or-
thogonality, and effectively eliminate intra-
cell interference (or that it is included as
part of the random noise). Thus, the received
SIR is obtained as xi = GihiPil/& with Pi the
downlink power, hi the path gain, and &2 the
average noise power at the receiver.
8) Packets received in error which cannot be
corrected result in ideal re-transmissions un-
til correctly received and confirmed.
A relatively simple analysis similar to that in
[9] tells us that, on the average, the number
of information bits successfully transferred by a
terminal over the time interval X is:
Bi(xi) = t(L/M)Rif(xi) (1)
V. OPTIMAL SIR AND OPTIMAL PRICE
In order to determine his bid, the operator must
find the maximal amount of revenues that he
can obtain from the various possible amounts of
spectrum he may win. Below, we focus on a single
band of width w, and later generalise. It is natural
for the operator to charge each terminal per unit
of allocated downlink power (we consider only
linear pricing). However, a price per power can
be easily converted to a price per received SIR
cixi. To see this, suppose that the terminal must
pay c per downlink Watt. Since the received SIR
is obtained as xi = GihiPi/l&, in order to enjoy
an SIR of xi, the terminal must order (a2/Gihi)xi
Watts of downlink power, for which it must pay
(G2/Gihi)exi. This payment can be written as cix
with ci:- (6/Gihi)8.
978-3-8007-2909-8/05/$20.00 ©2005 IEEE
-%
s
'9
1852
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Surrey. Downloaded on July 14,2010 at 11:42:22 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
2005 IEEE 16th International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications
The terminal chooses its received SIR xi to
maximise benefits minus cost: 3iBi(xi) - cixi, with
Bi given by eq. 1. fiBi(x,) is just a multiple of
the FSF and inherits its S-shape. Thus, we must
investigate how to maximise an expression of the
form S(x) - cx, where S is some S-curve. Once the
operator knows the terminal's best response to a
value of c, he can choose c to maximise revenues.
We perform this analysis in detail in [4], whose
main results we summarise below.
First, let us think that only one terminal is
active. Figure 1 illustrates the solution procedure.
First, if the line cx lies entirely above S, except at
the origin, the terminal should decline to operate,
since its cost would exceed its benefit for any
positive x. The largest value of c acceptable to the
terminal is c*, obtained as the slope of the unique
tangent line of S that goes through the origin.
For c < c*, the maximising choice is the largest
x at which the derivative of the S-curve equals c
Thus, for a given power price Ck the terminal
will find the matching SIR price ck = (¢T/Gih)c,
and will not operate if Ck > c*. Otherwise it will
choose an SIR (QoS level) xk satisfying S'(xk) =
Ck (e.g., in fig. 1 T1, the tangent of S at xl,
is parallel to clx). Then, the resulting operator's
revenue is CkXk XkS (Xk).
As shown by figure 1, the graph xS'(x) (rev-
enues) has a single-peak at xR, and crosses S(x)
at a unique positive value, x*, precisely the point at
which the tangent c*x meets S. With the constraint
c < c*, the curve xS'(x) (revenues) is maximised
at x - x* corresponding to c = c* resulting in
operator's revenues of c*x* _ x*S'(x*) - S(x*).
As long as the operator can charge an individual
price to each terminal, the single-terminal analysis
generalises easily. The operator will choose for
terminal j a price for downlink power, such that
its SIR price is c*, the slope of the only tangent
to Sj that goes through the origin. Since the
terminals share an identical FSF, f, then each Sj
is a multiple of the common f. It is easy to see
and prove that replacing Sj with a multiple of Sj
will change c). but will have no effect on the value
of x;. Thus, the terminals will choose an identical
SIR x*.
VI. SERVICE PRIORITY AND BIDDING
A. Power constraint
Section V tells us that as long as the terminals
have a common FSF, each terminal will end up
operating at the SIR x* (but each paying an
individual price c* for that SIR). With bandwidth
w, the necessary downlink power is obtained as:
w hiPi G* * 2x* Ri
R 7 =X=> Pi = h
The power constraint N1 P* < P can be writ-
ten as:
(3)
We can think of w as the "effective bandwidth",
which is the original amount amplified by the
the available "rise over thermal" (ROT) per unit
of required SIR, with ROT defined as P/&2.
Likewise, the ratio Ri/hi can be thought of as
the amount of "effective" bandwidth consumed by
terminal i.
B. Service priority: revenue per Hertz
Constraint 3 may not be satisfied with band-
width w. Thus, the operator needs a "service
priority". Such policy is obtained by comparing
the revenues provided by a terminal (if served)
to the amount of resources it consumes. Terminal
i, if served, will contribute revenues of Si(x*)
t(L/M)f(x*)iiRi:= tfiRi . We can think of t
t(L/M)f(x*) as the "net" or "effective" time of
operation, and fiRi as the revenues from i per
(effective) time unit (we can choose the time scale
so that t - 1). By dividing iRi by Ri/hi we
obtain terminal i's contribution to revenues per
unit of (effective) bandwidth: 3ihi. Now, with the
terminals' labels such that 13hl > ... > INhN,
our service criterion is simple and clear: serve
terminals 1 through P1, with 1J the largest index
such that,
I Ri<
i-l hi- (4)
C. Bidding
The preceding subsection tells us immediately
what the operator should offer for a single band
(the first component of the bid vector), namely
1i-liR for a convenient time scale. To know
how much to bid for an additional band, the key
is to determine the additional terminals that can be
served, which would tell us the additional revenue
brought by the band. Assuming that the chip
rate can be adjusted to match a larger bandwidth
(this is not strictly necessary), we can multiply
the right-hand side of constraint 4 by two, and
obtain 17 as the largest index that can satisfy
the new constraint, meaning that terminals I* + 1
through 14 could now be served. Likewise, we can
determine that terminals 1* + I through 13 could
additionally be served with a third band, and so
on. Then, the jth component of the bid has the
simple form (with Io := 0)
(2)
I
X PiRi
i=1 1+l
(5)
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and represents the contribution to revenues of the
additional terminals that can be served if the jth
band is won. For example, with 3 total bands and
6 active terminals, a bid vector may look like
[3IR1 + f2R2 + P3R3 P4R4 + f5R5 16R6 ]
VII. DISCUSSION
We have solved the problem of a CDMA op-
erator participating in a dynamic spectrum al-
location (DSA) scheme, in which a "spectrum
manager" periodically auctions short-term spec-
trum licenses. Delay-tolerant terminals operate at
dissimilar data rates in the downlink of a CDMA
cell, and each user has a distinct "willingness to
pay", Pi (the most he would pay for a successfully
transferred information bit). We have described a
realistic business model which could support our
scheme.
With conveniently chosen units, our analytical
results acquire crisp form. The interests of oper-
ator and end users meet at a specific operating
point: the SIR value x*, which is easily found
by drawing a tangent to the graph of the frame-
success rate function (FSF). At the optimum, a
served terminal's contribution to revenues is 3iRi
(with R, its data rate), the amount of "effective
spectrum" it consumes is Ri/hi (with hi its path
gain), and its service priority is ihi ("revenue
per Hertz"). The operator's optimal bid for a (an
additional) band of spectrum, takes the simple
form 3iRR with the sum covering the (additional)
terminals that can be served, if the band is won.
We assume that all we know about the phys-
ical layer is that its FSF is some S-curve. This
makes our analysis relevant to a wide variety of
practical configurations, and allows us to perform
link layer adjustments for revenue maximisation.
For instance, if modulation schemes A & B are
available, each produces its own FSF. For each S-
curve, we can determine the corresponding oper-
ating point (xn*Jm(xn4)), by drawing the tangent
mentioned above. For a given bandwidth, other
things being equal, the revenue provided by any
served terminal is directly proportional to f01(x1),
and the number of terminals that can be served is
decreasing in x,4, (see constraint 3). Thus, if xA <
XB and fA(xA) > fB(xM ) the modulation scheme A
should always be chosen. Otherwise the operator
will alternate between A and B depending on the
specific values of Pi, Ri and hi, determined by who
is active and where.
Some of the additional functionality necessi-
tated by DSA is discussed in [1]. In particular,
we would like the CDMA network to adjust its
chip rate to match available bandwidth. But we
can also apply our scheme with an inflexible chip
rate, if it matches the basic spectrum bands being
auctioned. While current networks and standards
do not support DSA, the needed functionality
seems well within reach, given the steady advance
of technology. Before any network upgrade, a
cost-benefit analysis should be performed. With
our results, we can perform auction-driven DSA
among CDMA operators. But this will not yield
the most impressive gains, because their "loads"
are likely to be highly correlated. With a UMTS
and a DVB-T operator participating in a DSA
scheme, [1] reports gains approaching 40%. Be-
fore we introduce a wireless broadcast operator
into our scheme, we must complete an analysis
similar to the present one, in order to understand
its bidding behaviour. Then, we could compare
our gains to those that have been reported.
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